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These dualities, if not eternal, have long appeared in Anglo-American
law.
Daniel Meador'
No real understanding is possible without awareness of these pairs of
opposites which permeate everything man does.
E.F. Schumacher 2
If life feels the tug of these opposing tendencies, so also must the law




Philosophers synthesize, judges balance, and politicians compro-
mise. In ethics, law, and politics, conflicts between thesis and antithesis,
individual rights and social policy, and competing interest groups create
the demand for resolutions of divergent perspectives. Very often these
conflicts involve value v. value (e.g. freedom v. equality) rather than
value v. disvalue (e.g. fairness v. unfairness, truth v. untruth, good v.
evil). When there is a parity between conflicting fundamental values, or
"when all interests involved are deemed worthy of protection, some rec-
onciliation between them will ordinarily be attempted. '" 4 All societies
experience the conflicts between competing fundamental values, and a
certain amount of conflict is a sign of societal vitality.
Conflict prevents the ossification of social systems by exerting pres-
sures for innovation and creativity; it prevents habitual accommoda-
tions from freezing into rigid molds and hence progressively
impoverishing the ability to react creatively to novel circumstances.
The clash of values and interests, the tension between what is and what
some groups or individuals feel ought to be, the conflict between vested
interest groups and new strata demanding their share of wealth, power,
and status are all productive of social vitality.5
If other institutions in our society do not resolve these conflicts, then
inevitably, the legal system becomes the forum for resolution.
This article isolates two "fundamental concepts" of our social and
legal system-liability and immunity, particularly sovereign immunity
and liability. After showing how the two concepts are conflicting funda-
mental opposites, this article will then illustrate how these fundamental
1. Meador, Some Yins and Yangs of Our Judicial System, 66 A.B.A.J. 122 (1980). Meador,
former president of the ABA, states that "there are numerous dualities, but I mention only four."
Id. Dualism may pervade the law as it does ordinary language.
2. E. SCHUMACHER, A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 127 (1977).
3. B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF THE LEGAL SCIENCE 7 (1928).
4. Bodenheimer, Compromise in the Realization of Ideas and Values in COMPROMISE IN ETH-
ICS, LAW, AND POLITICS 144 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1979).
5. Coser, Some Sociological Aspects of Conflict in 3 THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SOCIAL SCIENCES 235 (D. Sills ed. 1968).
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opposites clash by juxtaposing nine diametrically opposed justifications
or arguments for each concept. Finally, the reconcilation, or lack of it,
between these fundamental opposites is shown by the legal system's ap-
plication of them in such doctrines as absolute immunity, strict liability,
and qualified immunity. The themes of this article are summarized in
the quotes beginning it: 1) the presence of dualisms or opposites is inevi-
table; 2) awareness of these ever-present and present everywhere dual-
isms (here, liability v. immunity) is essential to legal understanding; and
3) the "tug" between the opposites is the source of synthesis. Conflict
becomes the source of creativity and ingenuity needed to seek proper
resolutions. In the words of John Dewey: "Conflict is the gadfly of
thought. It stirs us to observation and memory. It instigates to inven-
tion. Conflict shocks us out of sheeplike passivity, and sets us at noting
and contriving. . . . It is the sine qua non of reflection and ingenuity."
' 6
In short, fundamental opposites must be clearly isolated in two polar
perspectives; the more the dualisms are "clarified and logically devel-
oped, the more they diverge, until [they] appear to be exact opposites of
each other."'7 Then, out of this clash of clearly isolated fundamental op-
posites, the phoenix of creativity rises to aid the decisionmaker in the
proper synthesis, balance, or compromise of these fundamental conflicts.
II. THE OPPOSITES: IMMUNITY AND LIABILITY
Judges and practitioners often find little practical value in jurispru-
dence and theory. If theorists tend only to see the forest, and practition-
ers tend only to see the trees, then good theory and good practice occurs
when there is an ability to perceive the forest and trees, or to marry the
abstract with the concrete. One theorist whose writing "does indeed give
great aid to the analysis of legal problems and in breaking down our
complex and variable terms," is Wesley Hohfeld. Publishing his work
in 1919, Hohfeld analyzed eight "fundamental concepts" (right, privi-
lege, power, immunity, duty, no-right, liability and disability) which he
believed are "the lowest common denominators of the law" and which
made it possible "not only to discover essential similarities and illuminat-
ing analogies in the midst of what appears superficially to be infinite and
hopeless variety, but also to discern common principles of justice and
6. J. DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT 300 (1930).
7. E. SCHUMACHER, supra note 2, at 122.
8. Corbin, Foreword to W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS: As APPLIED
IN JUDICIAL REASONING x-xi (W. Cook ed. 1963).
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policy underlying the various jural problems involved." 9 Hohfeld repu-
diated the idea that his system was "a merely philosophical inquiry" and
stated that his main purpose was to "aid in the understanding and in the
solution of practical, everyday problems of the law."' 0
Hohfeld believed, perhaps correctly, that all legal problems could be
stated in terms of eight fundamental concepts because these concepts re-
duced all legal relationships "to their lowest generic terms."' " At the
same time, Hohfeld showed "the great practical importance of a clear
appreciation of the distinctions and discriminations set forth."' 2 Calling
Hohfeld's conceptual analysis "by far the most ingenious and influential
work" in conceptual analysis, Feinberg and Gross illustrated how
Hohfeld's system "is worked out with perfect symmetry and great
elegance."13
Hohfeld arranges the eight fundamental concepts in the following
scheme: 
1 4
Jural I right privilege power immunity
Opposites no-right duty disability liability
Jural I right privilege power immunity
Correlatives duty no-right liability disability
It is not possible to discuss fully Hohfeld's complete system in this arti-
cle.' 5 For immediate purposes, it should be noted that Hohfeld lists lia-
bility as the jural correlative of power and the jural opposite of
immunity. Similarly, he lists immunity as the jural correlative of disabil-
ity and the jural opposite of liability. The following discussion develops
the meaning of jural correlatives and jural opposites, then focuses on the
specific set of jural opposites which are the central topic of this article.
There is a critical difference between jural correlatives and jural op-
posites. A crude analogy can aid in making the distinction clear. In
9. W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS: As APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASON-
ING 64 (W. Cook ed. 1963).
10. Id. at 26.
11. Id. at 64.
12. Id. at 63.
13. J. FEINBERG & H. GROSS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 178-79 (2nd ed. 1980).
14. W. HOHFELD, supra note 9, at 65.
15. The system and illustration of its immense practical value are available elsewhere. See
Cook, Introduction to W. HOHFELD, supra note 9, at 3-22; J. FEINBERG & H. GROSS, supra note 13,
at 176-79. The chief insight of Hohfeld's analysis is the recognition that the term "right" is being
used to represent four distinct legal conceptions. Hohfeld's analysis separates these four relations in
the four concepts of "right", "privilege", "power", and "immunity" and then shows the jural oppo-
sites and jural correlatives of each. "One great merit of Hohfeld's analysis is that he adopted his
terms out of actual judicial usage." Corbin, supra note 8 at xii. A right is not the same as a privi-
lege, or a power, or an immunity. Each has different meanings, different correlatives, and different
opposites.
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American money, a coin cannot exist without a head and a tail. Though
distinctly different, the head and tail of a coin obviously have a common
relationship. Both distinctiveness and commonality are noted in the
cliche, "You're talking about two sides of the same coin." Heads and
tails are different sides of the same coin, though these different sides have
a common connection such that one cannot exist without the other. It
makes no sense to speak of a coin with only heads, or to speak of a coin
with only tails. Heads imply tails and tails imply heads. Though one is
only viewing one side of the coin (the head, for example), it is logical to
infer that the other side of the coin is tails.
A very similar relationship as to that of heads/tails/coins exists in
the legal concepts of rights/duty/law. Just as a head implies a tail on a
coin, a right implies a duty in the law. If one person holds a legal right,
then all other persons have the lawful duty to respect that right. Each
legal right implies that there is a legal duty not to violate that right.
Duties "co-relate" to rights much like heads co-relate to tails. This co-
relation, or the direct and perhaps proportional relationship, of rights
and duties has been the subject of much discussion in jurisprudence.
When two legal terms co-relate, such that the one implies the existence of
the other, the result is a set of "jural correlatives."
Jural opposites are quite different from jural correlatives. If jural
correlatives exist when one legal concept (here, a right) implies the pres-
ence of another legal concept (here, a duty), then jural opposites are legal
concepts where the presence of one legal concept implies the absence, or
negation, of the other. If immunity is the opposite of liability, and vice
versa, then immunity negates liability and liability negates immunity.
Where one is present, the other is absent. As jural opposites, immunity
and liability have a different meaning than when used with their jural
correlatives, which respectively are disability and power.
16
16. Because the correlatives of immunity and liability are not the topic of this article, an exten-
sive analysis of their meanings as legal correlatives is not necessary. In brief, if one individual holds
a power and, if that power is exercised, at least one individual will have his legal relations altered.
The situation Hohfeld described by saying that the one whose legal relations will be altered
if the power is exercised is under a "liability". Care must be taken to guard against misap-
prehension. "Liability" as commonly used is a vague term and usually suggests something
disadvantageous or burdensome. Not so in Hohfeld's system for a "liability" may be a
desirable thing. . . . [A]ny person can by offering to enter into a contract with another
person confer upon the latter-without his consent, be it noted-a power by "accepting"
the offer to bring into existence new legal relations. It follows that every person in the
community who is legally capable of contracting is under a liability to have such a power
conferred upon him at any moment.
Cook, supra note 15, at 8.
On the other hand, the correlative of immunity is disability. Cook describes the meaning of
immunity as a "right" in this context and disability as its correlative.
Another use of the term "right," possibly less usual but by no means unknown, is to denote
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Hohfeld's distinctions are very useful. If a government and a gov-
ernmental official have immunity, then this immunity has a correlative
"disability" on the part of the party who is suing; that is, the plaintiff is
"disabled" or dismissed from the suit due to the immunity of the defend-
ant government or official. The extent of the plaintiff's "disability" cor-
relates to the extent of defendant's immunity. If the defendant is
absolutely immune, the plaintiff is absolutely "disabled" from suing.
With immunity, the government or official has a form of "right", which
is the negative "right" of "freedom from the legal power or 'control' of
another as regards some legal relation."' 7 The plaintiff cannot sue the
defendant because of the defendant's immunity from suit. Immunity is,
then, a form of "right" held by the government or governmental official.
Immunity is a "trump" over other "rights", and thereby frees the im-
mune party from the claims of rights from others.' 8
If the jural correlatives of immunity and disability describe the legal
relationship of the immunized defendant and the disabled plaintiff, the
jural opposites of immunity and liability describe not only the immune
relationship but also its opposite, the liability relationship. If liability
attaches to the defendant, the defendant is not freed from the legal con-
trol of another, but rather is bound by it.' 9 Immunity is freedom from;
liability is the absence of this negative freedom, or is the state of being
controlled by, or bound to, another to the extent of the liability.
If at times the law justifies giving immunity to the sovereign and its
that one person is not subject to the power of another person to alter the legal relations of
the person said to have the "right." For example, often when we speak of the "right" of a
person not to be deprived of his liberty or property without due process of law, the idea
sought to be conveyed is of the exemption of the person concerned from a legal power on
the part of the persons composing the government to alter his legal relations in a certain
way. In such cases the real concept is one of exemption from legal power, i.e., "immu-
nity." At times, indeed, the word "immunity" is used in exactly this sense in constitutional
law. In Hohfeld's system it is the generic term to describe any legal situation in which a
given legal relation vested in one person cannot be changed by the acts of another person.
Correlatively, the one who lacks the power to alter the first person's legal relations is said
to be under a "disability," that is, he lacks the legal power to accomplish the change in
question.
Id. at 8-9. Obviously, Hohfeld's suggested use of the terms has not been followed. Immunity, as
used in this article and most others on the topic of sovereign immunity, means the "power" of the
government to alter a citizen's legal relations with impunity. Therefore, if the sovereign or the gov-
ernmental official has immunity in the sense of power, then the individual does not have an "immu-
nity" but has a "disability," as used and understood by Hohfeld. Using Hohfeldian terms, it would
be more accurate to speak of "sovereign power" rather than sovereign immunity, and "qualified
power" rather than qualified immunity. It also makes more common sense to do so. Unfortunately,
common sense is not so common in common law terminology.
17. W. HOHFELD, supra note 9, at 60.
18. For the contrary idea that rights are trumps over utilitarian policies designed to maximize
the greatest good for the greatest number, see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
19. The term "liable" comes from the French word ligare, which means to bind.
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employees, and at other times, the law justifies the imposition of liability,
then fundamental opposites clash. Because liability is "the very opposite
of immunity,"' 20 these two fundamental opposites should generate funda-
mentally opposite justifications. Such is the case. By definition, immu-
nity generates the exact opposite justifications of the justifications for
liability. These fundamental opposites protect fundamentally opposite
values and considerations. To paraphrase Schumacher, no real under-
standing is possible without an awareness of these pairs of opposing justi-
fications which permeate every discussion of, and decision affecting, the
immunity-liability dilemma.
III. NINE OPPOSING JUSTIFICATIONS UNDERLYING THE IMMUNITY-
LIABILITY DILEMMA
If immunity and liability are logical opposites, then each should gen-
erate logically opposing justifications. Justifications go beyond the doc-
trines of sovereign immunity, or their opposites of liability, and probe the
reasons for granting immunity or imposing liability. All forms of immu-
nity must be justified in a just society, as must all forms of liability. The
paradox of jural opposites is that each fundamental qpposite protects
fundamental values. The synthesis, balance, or compromise that is
struck is never easy and is always open to the demands of the opposing
justifications. Justice Cardozo, in his eloquent classic entitled The Para-
doxes of Legal Science, noted the pervasiveness of fundamental opposites
in the law, and opined as to the great problems in the law:
The reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the merger of antithesis, the
synthesis of opposites, these are the great problems of the law ...
We fancy ourselves to be dealing with some ultra-modem controversy,
the product of the clash of interests in an industrial society. The prob-
lem is laid bare, and at its core are the ancient mysteries crying out for
understanding.
2 '
Cardozo's jurisprudence is the philosophy of a dualist. He believed that
"[tihere are two principles inherent in the very nature of things, recur-
ring in some particular embodiments whatever field we explore-the
spirit of change, and the spirit of conservation. There can be nothing real
without both."' 22 The recognition of this inherent dichotomization of
principles escapes the logical analyst who believes that dilemmas can be
resolved by logic alone. Logic has its functions and its limits. Its func-
tion is to isolate logical opposites, such as liability and immunity, as well
20. W. HOHFELD, supra note 9, at 60.
21. B. CARDOZO, supra note 3, at 4.
22. Id. at 7 (quoting Whitehead).
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as to isolate their logically opposing justifications. The limits of logic end
at that point; logic cannot resolve the dilemma. Qualities of stateman-
ship beyond logic, such as understanding, wisdom, and experience, must
intervene to reconcile the "unending paradox.
'23
The following analysis attempts a logical analysis and nothing more.
Except to the extent that hidden values intrude in subtle ways, there is no
attempt to determine which justifications should be prioritized and which
should not. Rather, the following analysis suggests that "Order can be
produced out of chaotic law only through full understanding of policy
considerations. '24 If the present law of immunity-liability is chaotic,
perhaps it is because there is not a full understanding of the conflicting
justifications or policy considerations underlying the law.25 The follow-
ing nine headings attempt what no other analyst (to my knowledge) has
done: namely, to show that most of the common justifications or
rationales in the immunity-liability debate can be juxtaposed into nine
basic conflicting opposites.
26
23. Id. at 7.
24. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 27.01, at 546 (1958) "[Tlhe law gov-
erning the redress of the individual against public authorities, national, State, or municipal, for inju-
ries sustained in the exercise of governmental powers, is in a state of incongruity and confusion
unique in history." Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1924). More re-
cently, two noted writers observed: "In summary, the system of governmental liability resembles a
patchwork quilt, and a rather imperfectly constructed one, at that." W. GELHORN & CLARK BYSE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 377 (6th ed. 1974).
25. These nine conflicting justifications hopefully are comprehensive, but they certainly are not
exclusive. There are others which were omitted for various reasons. Also, there is no agreement
among analysts as to which justifications are more important than others. Therefore, the ordering of
the nine varies with different judges and observers.
26. This juxtapositioning is similar to the "Thrust" and "Parry" method in the classic: Llewel-
lyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and The Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are
To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). Llewellyn showed that fifty-six canons of statutory
interpretation could be juxtaposed to illustrate how "there are two opposing canons on a almost
every point." Id. at 401. As a legal realist, Llewellyn's point was to counteract formalism in the law;
however, in doing so his relativism omitted the utilities of dualism (chief of which are noted by
DEWEY, supra note 7, and Coser, supra note 5); to bring out conflicts which are the sine qua non of
reflection, ingenuity, and more creative reconciliations.
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1. Interest of People v. Interest of Individual
a. Immunity is necessary to pro- a. Liability is necessary to pro-
tect the interests of the public. tect the interests of the injured
victim.
b. "The interests of the people b. "It is as much the duty of
require that due protection be Government to render prompt
accorded to them [heads of execu- justice against itself in favor of
tive departments] in respect of citizens as it is to administer the
their official acts" 27  same between private individu-
als."'2
8
The immunity-liability dilemma involves the philosophical issue of
the many and the one, the political science issue of the state and the
citizen, and the sociological issue of the collective and the individual. In
the words of Justice Cardozo, "the one is in rivalry with the many, the
individual with the group, . . . where is the line that we shall call the
jural median?" 29 Immunity protects the interests of the many, the collec-
tive, or their representative, the state. Liability preserves the interest of
the one, the individual, or the citizen. Although not always mutually
exclusive (it can be argued that the best government is that government
which protects the individual), the rationales underlying the immunity-
liability issue tend to dichotomize into the state-individual, social utility-
individual rights, public policy-individual justice conundrum. These are
the "two considerations of high importance which . . . come into sharp
conflict-on the one hand, the protection of the individual citizen . . .
on the other, the protection of the public interest."' 30
Judges promoting immunity inevitably state: "Considerations of
'public policy and convenience' therefore compelled a judicial recogni-
tion of immunity from suits arising from official acts."' 31 Judges promot-
ing abrogation of immunity and favoring more liability of government
cite the morality and democratic nature of liability: "[Immunity] is an
anachronistic survival of monarchical privilege, and runs counter to
democratic notions of the moral responsibility of the State."'32 At its
27. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
28. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 580 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting (quoting Abraham Lincoln)).
29. B. CARDOZO, supra note 3, at 6.
30. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 564-65 (1959).
31. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 745 (1982).
32. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 580 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Commentators favoring liability argue that democracy, by definition, implies responsi-
bility and accountability of governmental officials, and in an era of expansive governmental power in
the hands of large numbers of nonelected administrative officials, absolute immunity is out-dated and
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broadest level, the issue is one that pits the public interest in an effective
government against individuals claiming injury by that government. It
should not be surprising, then, that the same court may have two sepa-
rate, often conflicting, lines of cases.
33
2. Rule of Law v. Rule of Man (Discretion)
a. Immunity is necessary to a. Liability is necessary to main-
maintain the supremacy of the tain the supremacy of the rule of
lawmaker (rule of man). law.
b. "A sovereign is exempt from b. "The Government of the
suit, not because of any formal United States has been emphati-
conception or obsolete theory, cally termed a government of
but on the logical and practical laws, and not of men. It will cer-
ground that there can be no legal tainly cease to deserve this high
right as against the authority that appellation, if the laws furnish no
makes the law on which the remedy for the violation of a
rights depends. ' ' 34  (Justice vested legal right."'35
Holmes)
The issue of sovereign immunity often involves vigorous debates
concerning who is sovereign: the government or the people, the
lawmaker or the law itself. One commentator states that "where the
claim is created by the federal Constitution, Holmes' logic does not hold:
The law set forth in that document was made by the people of the United
States, not by the state in question."' 36 Even in nonconstitutional areas,
even dangerous. See generally Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77
HARV. L. REV. 209, 215-18 (1963); James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Officers, 22 U.
CHI. L. REV. 610 (1955); Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263
(1937).
33. Professor Davis urges the U.S. Supreme Court to follow one line of cases favoring more
individual justice and governmental liability, and to discard another line of cases favoring more
governmental and official immunity. Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 AD. L. REV. 383
(1969).
34. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1970) (action based on local law against the
territory of the United States barred by sovereign immunity). The doctrine of common law sover-
eign immunity in nonconstitutional cases has incurred voluminous criticism calling for its partial or
complete abolition. See, e.g., Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 AD. L. REV. 383 (1969); W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 971 (4th ed. 1971); Comment, Sovereign Immunity: A Battle-
ground of Competing Considerations, 12 Sw. U.L.R. 457 (1981).
35. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 768 (1982) (White, J., dissenting; quoting Chief Justice
Marshall). "No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set
that law at defiance with impunity. All officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest,
are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it." United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
36. Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their
Own Courtsfor Constitutional Violations, 69 CAL. L. REV. 189, 196-97 (1981). U.S. CONST. pream-
ble ("We the People of the United States... do ordain and establish this Constitution"); see, Willis,
The Doctrine of Sovereignty Under the United States Constitution, 15 VA. L. REV. 437, 453 (1929).
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Holmes' belief that the government should be immune qua lawmaker has
caught fire from critics. Professor Davis states: "Today hardly anyone
agrees that [Holmes'] stated ground for exempting the sovereign from
suit is either logical or practical."
' 37
Although advocates of immunity no longer give credence to the
maxim that the king can do no wrong, 38 they have not been willing to
replace rule of man totally by rule of law in the area of immunity. Some
immunity is necessary to protect discretion ("rule of man"). 39 No gov-
ernment can exist without some discretion, and the extravagant version
of the rule of law (epitomized by the phrase, "We are a government of
laws and not of men") has been rejected. The ideal of the supremacy of
the rule of law has not, can not, nor should be realized. "Every govern-
ment has always been a government of laws and of men . . . [n]o govern-
ment has ever come close to being a government of laws and not of men.
Every system of administration has always had a large measure of discre-
tionary power." 4 If one believes Professor Davis' recent assertions that
ninety percent of all administrative action is informal discretionary con-
duct, then discretion (not possession!) is nine-tenths of the law.41 The
point is that immunity is just one of many sources for allowing and pro-
tecting discretion ("rule of man"), and discretionary powers allow gov-
ernmental officials to rule without preordained laws. Therefore,
immunity, like rule of man discretion, threatens the ideal of rule of law
and whenever immunity is granted, dissenting judges point out that the
grant of immunity places the official beyond the law because no law lim-
its the official's decision. 42 Immunity prioritizes more rule of man by
providing more protection for discretionary decisions; liability prioritizes
37. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 96 (1975).
38. "The maxim is pointless where there is no king." Maguire, State Liability for Tort, 30
HARV. L. REV. 20 (1916). However, Jaffe's historical analysis of immunity suggests that the maxim
meant "precisely the contrary to what it later came to mean." Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963). Jaffe argues that the maxim meant the
King was not entitled to do wrong and must not do so, though obviously the English government
and the King himself were factually capable of it.
39. "At the outset it was more or less obvious that some vestige of the governmental immunity
must be retained." W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 131, at 986. For a more thorough discussion of
the philosophical foundations for the rule of law v. rule of man debate, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2:10-2:12, at 97-117 (2nd ed. 1978); Spader, Rule of Law v. Rule of Man
(Discretion): The Search for the Golden Zigazg Between Conflicting Fundamental Values, 12 J. OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 379-94 (1984).
40. K. DAVIS, supra note 37, at 33 (emphasis original).
41. K. DAVIS, supra note 39, at 14.
42. "Now, however, the Court clothes the Office of the President with sovereign immunity,
placing it beyond the law." Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 767 (1982) (White, J., dissenting)
(granting absolute presidential immunity for damages caused by actions of the President within the
outer perimeter of the President's official responsibility).
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more rule of law by providing more compensation for individuals injured
by certain decisions which fall outside the legal powers of a government
official. Advocates of immunity would leave more decisions of officials
discretionary; advocates of liability would confine, structure, and check
more of the decisions of government officers by more rule of law.43
3. Protecting Decisionmaking v. Compensating Injuries
a. Immunity is necessary to pro- a. Liability is necessary to pre-
tect the functioning of govern- serve the accountability of gov-
ment. ernment.
b. "Of course, it is not a tort for b. For every wrong there ought
government to govern, . ."44 to be a remedy. "[T]he general
(Justice Jackson) rule is, and always has been, that
there must be a remedy for every
wrong, that the doctrine of
immunity runs directly counter to
this basic concept of justice."'45
Justice Jackson's oft-cited phrase capsulizes the concept that gov-
ernment can commit injuries while governing without incurring tort lia-
bility. Much government action by definition affects various individuals
and interest groups adversely. When government governs and thereby
engages in injurious actions, immunity denies a remedy for the injury,
which is precisely why immunity competes with the principle of justice
that urges courts to provide remedies for every wrong.4 6 The latter prin-
ciple has been the chief reason why sovereign immunity has not had ex-
pansive application for municipal corporations.47  Injuries caused by
governing are not torts under the legal doctrine of sovereign immunity.
These two countervailing principles, the one stating that governmental
immunity for injuries committed while governing is a necessity and the
other stating that immunity destroys a basic principle of justice, have
43. See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924). "The 'rule of law'
which Dicey and others extol is designed by judicial control to restrict within the bounds of legality
the operation of the governmental machine in its contact with the citizen." Id.
44. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57 (1957) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
45. H. GRILLIOT, INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 122 (3rd ed. 1983).
46. A corollary principle of justice is "Elemental notions of fairness dictate that one who causes
a loss should bear the loss." Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 654 (1980).
47. See 18 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.02 (3rd. rev. ed. 1977) at 104:
[T]he sovereign or governmental immunity doctrine, holding that the state, its subdivisions
and municipal entities, may not be held liable for tortious acts was never completely ac-
cepted by the courts, its underlying principle being deemed contrary to the basic concept of
the law of torts that liability follows negligence . . . As a result, the trend of judicial
decisions was always to restrict, rather than expand, the doctrine of municipal immunity.
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created the ever-present question whether immunity is a "despotic man-
tle or creature of necessity."
48
The failure of many commentators to recognize the underlying para-
dox leads many to make absolutist statements that speak in terms of di-
chotomies rather than degrees.49 It makes no sense to call for the
complete abolition of sovereign immunity, just as it makes no sense to
advocate its total adoption in all governmental actions.5 0 In the Dalehite
case, which probably involved one of the greatest claims of damages in
an immunity suit, even the dissenting Justice Jackson found it necessary
to say "of course" governing is not a tort.51 The question is not whether
immunity or liability should prevail; both are necessary and both will
remain part of the law pertaining to governments. The question is one of
degree: How much immunity or liability should exist? That question
inevitably will involve a shifting dynamic answer depending on the de-
gree to which the many policy considerations underlying immunity or
liability are prioritized. One set of competing considerations is the gov-
ernment's need for immunity from injuries committed while governing as
opposed to the victim's demand for individual justice and a remedy. The
loss must fall somewhere and the choices are to place it on the taxpaying
public, the offending official, the governmental entity, the injured, or
some combination of these. The goal is to "reconcile the plaintiff's right
to compensation with the need to protect the decisionmaking processes"
of government. 5
2
4. Separation of Powers v. Combination of Powers
a. Immunity is necessary to a. Liability is necessary to allow
maintain separation of powers. the judicial branch to check the
power of other branches.
b. "The primary justification for b. "Courts of justice are estab-
48. Harley and Wasinger, Governmental Immunity: Despotic Mantle or Creature of Necessity,
16 WASHBURN L.J. 12 (1976).
49. G.K. Chesterton once defined a paradox (and I paraphrase) as a truth standing on its head
trying to get attention. If a paradox is a truth, it ought not to be abolished simply because it requires
a bit of balancing to deal with it.
50. Most critics of the doctrine make the same mistake as its advocates did-to seek total
victory. The following statement is an example of the type of conclusion against sovereign immunity
that uses terms of dichotomy rather than degree: "Whatever usefulness sovereign immunity may
have once served has long since been outlived. It should be put to rest along with the other dino-
saurs of the law." Comment, supra note 34, at 484. To equate immunity to dinosaurs is a profound
failure to recognize the necessity of immunity for some governmental functions.
51. Dalehite v. U.S., 346 U.S. 15, 57 (1953) (involved over 300 suits arising from an explosion
in a Texas harbor of 4850 tons of fertilizer which leveled much of Texas City, Texas, and killed over
300 people).
52. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 503 (1978).
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the retention of the sovereign lished, not only to decide upon
immunity doctrine is that it pre- controverted rights of the citizens
vents the courts from interfering as against each other, but also
unduly with operations of the upon rights in controversy
executive branch." 53  between them and their govern-
ment."
54
This rationale removes the debate from more abstract jurispruden-
tial principles of law to social and political philosophies of government.
Discussions of the relationships of the coordinate branches of govern-
ment pervade most U.S. Supreme Court decisions affecting the immu-
nity-liability balance. In terms of the quantity of discussion about the
purpose of immunity, this rationale certainly is "primary." Numerous
courts have stated that sovereign immunity is a legislative issue. The
argument for separation of powers is a pervasive and powerful basis for
attaching immunity. In the trend-changing case of Owen v. City of Inde-
pendence, Mo., where the Court refused to grant the municipality a good
faith defense and imposed a form of strict liability, the Court still recog-
nized that many decisions are immune from judicial intervention:
A large part of the municipality's responsibilities involved broad dis-
cretionary decisions on issues of public policy--decisions that affected
large numbers of persons and called for a delicate balancing of compet-
ing considerations. For a court or jury, in the guise of a tort suit, to
review the reasonableness of the city's judgment on these matters
would be an infringement upon the powers properly vested in a coordi-
nate and coequal branch of government. 55
If the separation of functions is reduced, the courts in effect review the
discretionary, policymaking decisions which are the functions of the
other branches of government and thereby combine all functions in the
judiciary.5 6 Using the separation of powers rationale as a basis for immu-
nity engages the court in theories of judicial review, which theories con-
stitute multiple degrees ranging along a spectrum from judicial activism
on the one hand to extreme judicial restraint on the other.57 Those favor-
53. W. GELHORN & B. BOYER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESSES 291 (1981).
54. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882). Lee is a classic case which "categorically
rejected the government's claim that the suit infringed upon its sovereign immunity." B.
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 578 (2nd ed. 1984). Schwartz provides a concise overview of
tort suits and the trends, §§ 19.7-19.27 at 557-82. Professor Davis has urged the Court to retain the
spirit and holding of the Lee case. K. DAVIS, supra note 24, § 27.10, at 614.
55. 445 U.S. 622, 648 (1980).
56. Immunity for 'discretionary' activities serves no other purpose except to assure that
courts refuse to pass judgment on policy decisions in the province of coordinate branches
of government. Accordingly, to be entitled to immunity the state must make a showing
that such a policy decision, consciously balancing risks and advantages, took place.
Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 794 n.8, 447 P.2d 352, 361 n.8 (1968).
57. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Sym-
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ing liability and the need for judicial determination of it emphasize the
protection of individual rights, especially constitutional rights. 58 Judicial
activism becomes a necessity to assure that important constitutional
rights are not read out of a statute by the statute's silence about them or
by the application of immunity.
5 9
On the other hand, those favoring immunity and the need for a clear
separation of powers emphasize judicial abstention. 6° Before exercising
jurisdiction, a "court must balance the constitutional weight of the inter-
est to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and
functions of the Executive branch. '61 Often, the presence of other reme-
dies and other means of controlling governmental action are used to pro-
vide further justification for the courts to abstain and to tolerate a
privilege of immunity. 62 Abstentionists believe the presumption should
be against judicial interference with the decisions of other branches of
posium: Judicial Review versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981); A. BONNICKSEN, CIVIL
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 185-202 (listing seven different judicial positions on a range from extreme
restraint to extreme activism).
58. See Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932) (restraining the executive power of the
Governor of Texas). "When there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has
overridden private rights secured by that Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial
inquiry in an appropriate proceeding directed against the individuals charged with the transgres-
sion." Id. at 398.
59. "[W]here constitutional rights are at stake the courts are properly astute, in construing
statutes, to avoid the conclusion that Congress intended to use the privilege of immunity . . . in
order to defeat them." P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 336 (2nd ed. 1973). Professor Davis argues that even if immu-
nity were abolished for torts and specific relief, "courts will still be limited to deciding issues appro-
priate for judicial determination, and they will still be limited by the limitations on the scope of
judicial review prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act in 5 U.S.C. § 706." Davis, supra
note 34, at 405.
60. See, e.g., Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445
U.S. 622 (1980). "The rationale for immunity derives from the theory of the separation of pow-
ers. . . . This Court has recognized the importance of preserving the autonomy of executive bodies
entrusted with discretionary powers." Id. at 677-78.
61. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 754 (1982). See Nixon v. General Services Administra-
tion, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-13 (1974).
62. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), the Court listed several alternatives.
A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave the Nation without sufficient
protection against misconduct on the part of the Chief Executive. There remains the con-
stitutional remedy of impeachment. In addition, there are formal and informal checks on
Presidential action. . . . The President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press. Vig-
ilant oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Presidential abuses of office . ...
Other incentives to avoid misconduct may include a desire to earn re-election, the need to
maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and a President's traditional con-
cern for his historical stature.
Id. at 757. However, none of these alternative remedies redress the harm done to the injured victim
and most are inapplicable to the thousands of governmental officials who are nonelected bureaucrats,
which probably explains the Court's switch from absolute immunity for many high level executive
branch officials, Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), to only a qualified immunity, Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). For hapless victims, if the courtroom door is closed by the immunity
bar, an alternative is a private bill but "[1]egislative relief is time-consuming to obtain, due to the
need to work out compromises acceptable to a majority." Comment, supra note 34, at 469.
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government. 63
The separation of powers debate had its first judicial expression in
Marbury v. Madison.64 Marbury gave the judiciary the power to invali-
date a law passed by Congress if the Court found the statute to be repug-
nant to the Constitution. 65 Eighteen years later, Chief Justice Marshall,
by way of dictum and without justifying reasons, expressed the first re-
ported opinion on the federal government's immunity.66 Although some
scholars have termed the process of how the doctrine of immunity be-
came established in the United States "one of the mysteries of legal
evolution," the intermingling of it with the separation of powers doctrine
began early and continues as an unabated debate today. 67
5. Fairness To Government Official v. Fairness To Injured Victim
a. Immunity is necessary to pro-
vide fairness and protect good
faith exercise of discretion.
b. "[B]asic fairness requires a
qualified immunity. . . . The
good faith defense. . . authorizes
liability only when officials acted
with malicious intent or when
they 'knew or should have known
that their conduct violated the
a. Liability is necessary to pro-
vide fairness by allocating losses
caused by good faith ignorance of
the law.
b. "[I]t is fairer to allocate any
resulting financial loss to the
inevitable costs of government
borne by all taxpayers."' 70 "The
knowledge that a municipality
will be liable for all of its injurous
conduct, whether committed in
63. "First, as recognized by the doctrine of separation of powers, some governmental decisions
should be at least presumptively insulated from judicial review." Owen v. City of Independence,
Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 667 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
64. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
65. Chief Justice Marshall provided the initial attempt to draw the line between the branches of
government:
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire
how the executive, or executive officers perform duties in which they have discretion.
Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to
the executive, can never be made in this court.
Id. at 170. This limiting statement must be viewed against the following expansive statement: "It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id. at 177.
66. "The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against
the United States; that the Judiciary Act does not authorize such suits." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821).
67. Borchard, supra note 24, at 4. This mystery also was acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme
Court in United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882): "[T]he principle has never been discussed
or the reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as an established doctrine." For a more
complete history, see Jaffe, supra note 38; Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers.- Damage
Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209 (1963).
68. Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 669 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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constitutional norm.' ",68 "It has good faith or not, should ...
been customary to explain the minimize the likelihood of unin-
discretionary exception on one or tentional infringements on consti-
both of two grounds. The first is tutional rights."
'7'
the injustice, particularly in the
absence of bad faith, of subjecting
to liability an officer who is
required by law to exercise discre-
tion." 6
9
The good faith defense conflicts with the basic principle that igno-
rance of the law is no excuse. Qualified immunity may exist when there
is a good faith belief by the governmental official that his actions are
lawful. Ignorance of the law, then, provides the excuse or immunity if
the good faith ignorance results in the violation of rights and causes in-
jury.72 Proponents of more liability believe that the good-faith defense
encourages ignorance of the law, which in turn causes more violations of
rights. "Unless countervailing considerations counsel otherwise, the in-
justice of such a result should not be tolerated. '73
Proponents of more immunity argue that the "countervailing con-
siderations" should include fairness to the governmental official.
Although withdrawal of the good faith defense provides more fairness to
the injured victims of malfeasance, retention of it provides more fairness
to the governmental official whose "liability should not attach unless
there was notice that a constitutional right was at risk."' 74 Herein exists a
69. Jaffe, supra note 67, at 223. "By placing the office above the Constitution because of a
stated policy of fairness to the official, the Butz Court allows a greater unfairness since damages are
denied to the victim of the constitutional deprivation." Comment, Executive Immunity For Consti-
tutional Torts After Butz v. Economou, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 453, 480 (1980).
70. Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 655 (1980).
71. Id. at 651-52.
72. "Yet owing to qualified immunity enjoyed by most governmental officials. many vic-
tims of municipal malfeasance would be left remediless if the city were also allowed to assert a good-
faith defense." Id. at 651.
73. Id. The rejection of the good faith defense has another justification which is based on deter-
rence theory. Greater deterrence will be obtained, the argument goes, if government officials are
required to know the law, especially constitutional law.
74. Id. at 660 (Powell, J., dissenting). Professor Davis distills the Owen decision and Monell v.
Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) into the following:
If a municipality's legal adviser guesses wrong about which turn constitutional develop-
ment may take and the municipality in good faith, on the basis of his advice, takes action
that "may fairly be said to represent official policy," but that action is later held to deprive
a person of his constitutional rights, the municipality is liable for damages, whether its
action is governmental, proprietary, discretionary, ministerial, executive, legislative, or
judicial.
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.03 at 395 (1982 Supp.). Even Davis advocates a
number of limitations on the present state of strict liability for municipalities, especially limitations
which will protect legislative and judicial functions. Id. § 25.04 at 399-402 and § 26.23 at 475-80.
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classic example of an irreconcilable conflict between agents of govern-
ment and private citizens. Governmental officials may be held liable for
violations of which they had no knowledge or notice, or private citizens
may be remediless if the ignorance of the law ("good-faith") of the offi-
cial is established. In Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., the Court "re-
solved" the issue by attaching strict liability only to the governmental
entity (which provides a remedy for the victim) but granting qualified
immunity to the official (which protects the official from liability for
good-faith errors).
75
6. Encouraging Risk v. Encouraging Caution
a. Immunity is necessary to
encourage risk, vigorous exercise
of official authority, decisiveness,
principled decisionmaking, flexi-
bility in government decisions
and actions and to avoid paraly-
sis.
b. "Implicit in the idea that offi-
cials have some immunity-abso-
lute or qualified-for their acts, is
a recognition that they may err.
The concept of immunity
assumes this and goes on to
assume that it is better to risk
some error than not to decide or
act at all."
' 76
a. Liability is necessary to
encourage due care and caution,
attentiveness, vigilance, responsi-
bility, accountability, diligence,
and to require minimal knowl-
edge of the law and individual
rights. Immunity breeds negli-
gence; liability breeds caution.
b. "The knowledge that a
municipality will be liable for all
injurious conduct . . . should
create an incentive for officials
who may harbor doubts about the
lawfulness of their intended
actions to err on the side of pro-
tecting citizens' constitutional
rights." 77  "[P]erhaps an
increased sense of caution and
responsibility . . . would be
wholesome." 7
8
This set of conflicting rationales is the most perplexing. Completely
contradictory statements emerge from the courts depending upon
whether the courts want governmental officials to be adventurous, deci-
75. "The offending official, so long as he conducts himself in good faith, may go about his
business secure in the knowledge that a qualified immunity will protect him from personal liability
for damages. . . . And the public will be forced to bear only the costs of injury inflicted by the
'execution of a government's policy.'" Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 657
(1980).
76. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242 (1974).
77. Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 651-52 (1980).
78. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 58 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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sive, risk-taking actors, or whether the courts believe governmental offi-
cials should be cautious, careful, doubt-harboring actors. On the
negative side, proponents of immunity argue that government officials
will be unduly timid, compromising, and chilled by the extension of lia-
bility. "Caution, of course, is not always a virtue and undue caution is to
be avoided."' 79 This rationale for immunity also underlies the exception
for discretionary decisions. "[I]f the officer is answerable, he may hesi-
tate to do what should be done and the government is the loser."' 80 To
the extent that the courts seek zeal above caution, action above doubt,
effectiveness of government above compensation to the injured, and bold-
ness above fear, they will incline toward more immunity.81 To the extent
that those values are reversed, the courts will move toward liability. The
public interest in the vigorous and effective discharge of official responsi-
bilities must be balanced against the need for accurate and effective reme-
dies for citizens whose rights have been violated.
8 2
Z Closing the Public Fisc v. Opening the Public Fisc
a. Immunity is necessary to pro-
tect the public treasury and taxes
from claims of individuals.
b. "The essential point to be
made is that sovereign immunity
survives as a historical vestige of
early pragmatic considerations,
necessitating the protection of the
public purse of a young, a rela-
tively impoverished federal and
state body politic."
'8 3
a. Liability is necessary to use
the public treasury and taxes to
compensate individuals.
b. "The innocent individual
who is harmed by an abuse of
governmental authority is assured
that he will be compensated for
his injury."
8 4
The public interest in protecting against raids on the public fisc and
79. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 784 (1982).
80. Jaffe, supra note 67, at 223. Jaffe states that the justifications for immunity in 5 and 6 are
the two customary reasons given "to explain the discretionary exception." Id. at 223.
81. Judge Learned Hand advanced the same rationale:
[T]o submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the
inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or
the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.
Gregorie v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950) (denying
relief to a plaintiff for false imprisonment).
82. See Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.S.L.A. L.
REV. 463 (1963).
83. Sherry, The Myth That the King Can Do No Wrong: A Comparative Study of the Sovereign
Immunity Doctrine in the United States and New York Court of Claims, 22 AD. L. REV. 597, 613
(1969).
84. Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980).
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the principle of compensation often collide. Where the claims for com-
pensation are large, the court may explicitly acknowledge the need to
"protect the public treasury. '8 5 Jaffe's review of the history of the legal
tradition of immunity concludes that "treasury liability for tort" is one of
the three "sensitive areas" 86 and that "expediency rather than any ab-
stract theory" determined the presence or absence of immunity. 87 His-
torically, when nightwatchman governmental entities were the norm, the
governmental budget was nearly non-existent and immunity was the
pragmatic means of limiting claims on the budget. With the massive de-
velopment, first of the regulatory state then of the welfare state, and the
inherent power which regulation and welfare monies conveyed to govern-
mental officials, immunity no longer protected just the nightwatchman; it
also protected the regulator, investigator, adjudicator, prosecutor, ad-
ministrator and dispenser of the welfare monies. The immense change in
government has led some analysts to argue that immunity has changed
from being a shield for limited public funds to being a shield for immense
governmental power.
Sovereign immunity is at best a judicial protective device created to
immunize a weak government against oppressive and insensitive citi-
zen demands. It had vogue and was appropriate to American jurispru-
dence when government weakness and citizen rapacity were
paramount. Today it is the citizen who is helpless in the face of grow-
ing governmental intrusion into his very life, often with unpredictable
and tragic results. The likelihood that government will continue to
grow and make its presence felt is self-evident. Thus immunity, both
in its judicial and non-judicial sense, is not only anachronistic but also
dangerous to our democratic institutions if allowed to exist untramel-
led by controls appropriate to contain it. 88
Whether immunity is a limiter on tax burdens or a ravisher of citizen
liberties, the immunity-liability issue is "paradoxical precisely because it
is difficult to strike the appropriate balance between the individual and
the state when the costs to one meet head-on with the goals of the
other."' 89 It is clear that two policy interests-the one protecting individ-
uals' rights and the other protecting public fics, the one compensating
injured parties and the other limiting governmental budgets (or defi-
cits)-are at loggerheads.
Advocates of more immunity also point out the monetary inequity
85. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 60 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting how the
discretionary exception of the Torts Claim Act is meant to protect public taxes).
86. Jaffe, supra note 38, at 29.
87. Id. at 3.
88. Sherry, supra note 83, at 615.
89. Comment, supra note 69, at 478.
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of imposing strict liability on small municipal governmental units, but
not on larger state and federal budgets, 90 and of imposing liability on the
lower paid ministerial employees at the more operational levels of gov-
ernment but not on employees with discretionary, policy making powers,
who are at the higher paying levels of government. 9' Equitable loss-
spreading within a governmental unit also may create inequitable loss-
spreading between governmental units. Different balancings on the im-
munity-liability scale for different levels of government and governmen-
tal employees create, critics argue, inequitable monetary burdens. "The
jogged interface of these diametrically opposed considerations goes a
long way in explaining the deplorable state of the law in this area."92
8. Continuity of Government v. Stopping the Government in its Tracks
a. Immunity is necessary to pro- a. Liability is necessary to stop
vide continuous government for government in its tracks when it
the community as a whole. is injurious to individual rights.
b. "There are the strongest rea- b. "If it was a trespass, then the
sons of public policy for the rule officers of the government should
that such relief cannot be had be restrained whether they be pro-
against the sovereign. The gov- fessed to be acting for the govern-
ernment, as representative of the ment or not."
'94
community as a whole, cannot be
90. "The Court neglects, however, the fact that many local governments lack the resources to
withstand substantial unanticipated liability under § 1983. . . . [R]uinous judgments under the
statute could imperil local governments." Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 670
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
91. "The practical effect of the discretionary test is that it carves out a broad sector of
governmental employees (those whose jobs do not require the use of discretion), who for-
merly were protected by the sovereign immunity doctrine, and singles them out to be per-
sonally liable for their negligence. Who are these employees? They are those least able to
pay a personal judgment. Only policymaking employees (whose jobs require the use of
discretion) and who therefore are the highest paid government employees, will be allowed
to invoke the doctrine to shield themselves from personal liability.
Kruger v. Wilson, 325 N.W.2d 851, 855 (S.D. 1982) (Fosheim, C.J., dissenting). This inequity may
be remedied by liability insurance or personal errors and omissions insurance, which also draws on
the public exchequer or the lower level employee's niggardly salary.
92. Comment, supra note 34, at 470. On the other hand, federalism demands independence and
local control of the state and local governments and it may be a bit naive to expect consistency
between different levels of government in an area, such as the immunity-liability dilemma, which has
so many competing considerations to balance.
93. Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949). Larson
quoted Decator v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 516 (1840), to buttress its rejection of specific
relief: " 'The interference of the Courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive
departments of the government, would be productive of nothing but mischief; and we are quite
satisfied that such a power was never intended to be given them.' " 337 U.S. at 704. Davis calls the
Larson case "the cornerstone of federal law of sovereign immunity for two decades." K. DAVIS,
supra note 24, at 338.
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stopped in its tracks by any plain-
tiff who presents a disputed ques-
tion of property or contract
right." 9
3
Since Ex parte Young, the need to protect the government from be-
ing "stopped in its tracks" has conflicted with the need to prevent illegal
actions of governmental officials by the granting of specific relief in the
form of injunctions, declaratory judgments, and remedies other than
damages. In order to overcome the obvious impossibility of stopping a
governmental official in his tracks, but not stopping the government in its
tracks, the courts have relied on the Young fiction that a governmental
official who acts unlawfully is stripped of his governmental character
"and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual con-
duct."'95 A governmental officer stripped naked by his illegality is no
longer acting for the government-in theory. Practically, it is obvious
that the stopping of a governmental official, naked or clothed with
power, is stopping the government.
These competing rationales-the need for continuity in government
and the need to stop abusive or excessive uses of power-arise most often
in specific relief cases. The rationales closely parallel the competing con-
siderations underlying the separation of powers rationales. Inconsistency
and unpredictability have been present precisely because the conflicting
rationales have been reconcilable only through legal fictions. The case
law represents the "balance of two principles of first importance to the
American legal system. When equally important factors are balanced
against each other, however, the result is often two irreconcilable lines of
decisions."'9
6
Calling the law of sovereign immunity "sophistical and erratic" and
calling for an amendment to the APA allowing specific relief, Professor
Davis has listed several instances to show that "courts including the
Supreme Court are constantly interfering with public administration and
constantly stopping the government in its tracks."'97 As part of the trend
against immunity, 98 the federal government partially ended the need for
94. Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536, 544 (1926). See also Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S.
605 (1912).
95. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908) (allowing injunction against a state attorney
general under equity powers despite the sovereign immunity doctrine and the eleventh amendment).
96. Comment, supra note 34, at 474.
97. Davis, supra note 34, at 401.
98. The Court of Claims Act of 1855 currently at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976); The Tucker Act of
1975, currently at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976); the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, currently at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-80 (1976).
IMMUNITY V LIABILITY
the fiction and amended the APA in 1976 to allow actions "seeking relief
other than money damages." 99 However, it is clear that even with the
1976 amendment to the APA, there are circumstances when this immu-
nity rationale (not stopping the government in its tracks) still may pre-
vail, if for no other reasons than that all the exceptions contained in the
waiver of suits for damages may also
for specific relief.'o
be contained in the waiver of suits
9. Deterring Lawsuits v. Encouraging Lawsuits
a. Immunity is necessary to pre-
vent vexatious lawsuits and main-
tain the judicial floodgates against
an inundation of lawsuits.
b. It is necessary to develop
"various rules and doctrines...
sufficient to prevent a flood of
burdensome litigation. .... ,
a. Liability is necessary to open
the courthouse door and provide
more remedies to hapless plain-
tiffs.
b. "The american dream
teaches that if one reaches high
enough and persists there is a
forum where justice is dispensed
. . . let the Courts serve that
ancient need."1
0 2
This set of competing rationales is similar, but not identical, to those
above which argue for immunity in order not to allow interference with
the prompt and effective administration of public affairs in the executive
and legislative branches. The floodgates rationale switches the argument
of potential interference to the judicial branch in order to support more
immunity. The countervailing rationale is that the courts must be the
stopgap for all injustices not remedied by the other branches of
government. 1
0 3
99. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
100. Even Professor Davis, probably the harshest critic of immunity, acknowledged that such
exceptions as military emergency are "the most persuasive reason" for some sovereign immunity.
Davis, supra note 34, at 393. Yet, he maintains that since the 1976 Amendment allowing specific
relief, whose "meaning is simple and entirely clear," the courts have still allowed the defense because
"the legal mind has ways of transforming what is simple and clear into something complex and
confused." K. DAVIS, supra note 74, at 481.
101. Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity,
Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1479, 1526 (1962).
102. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 519 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
103. With the growing complexities of government it [the judiciary] is often the one and
only place where effective relief can be obtained. . . . [W]here wrongs to individuals are
done by violation of specific guarantees, it is abdication for courts to close their doors ...
To wait for a sign from Congress is to allow important constitutional questions to go unde-
cided and personal liberty unprotected.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 111-12 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) (granting standing to a taxpayer
to challenge federal spending for parochial schools in violation of the first amendment establishment
clause).
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The nine conflicting justifications (18 total) are not mutually exclu-
sive and there is considerable overlap between them. There are also more
specific justifications which flesh out the general ones given above. How-
ever, the juxtapositioning should indicate the central thesis based upon
Hohfeld's jurisprudence: opposite fundamental concepts generate oppo-
site justifications. If Hohfeld is correct in his analysis of immunity and
liability as jural opposites, then it should not be surprising that these
fundamental concepts which describe legal relations generate opposing
justifications. Conflicting justifications which are at loggerheads should
be the expected logical result. The process of synthesizing, balancing, or
compromising these conflicts requires human faculties beyond logic.
These conflicting justifications cannot be resolved, as by some elimina-
tion process.
Divergent problems cannot be killed; they cannot be solved in the
sense of establishing a "correct formula"; .... It is important for us
to become fully aware of these pairs of opposites. Our logical mind
does not like them: it generally operates on the either/or yes/no prin-
ciple, like a computer. So, at any time it wishes to give its exclusive
allegiance to either one or the other of the pair, and since this exclu-
siveness inevitably leads to an ever more obvious loss of realism and
truth, the mind may suddenly change sides, often without even notic-
ing it. It swings like a pendulum from one opposite to the other, and
each time there is a feeling of "making up one's mind afresh"; or the
mind may become rigid and lifeless, fixing itself on one side of the pair
of opposites and feeling that now "the problem has been solved." The
pairs of opposites put tension into the world, a tension that sharpens
man's sensitivity and increases his self-awareness. 10 4
Becoming fully aware of the pairs of opposites creates the needed tension
to set the mind at creating the synthesis, balance, or compromise of the
fundamental opposites.
The following sections illustrate the opposites in their legal form and
the degrees between the opposites. Once degrees of balance are recog-
nized, multiple options become available for the creative balance. ' 0 5 The
analysis provides a framework with which to understand the dichoto-
mous opposites and degrees underlying the fundamental concepts and
their progeny (other legal opposites such as good faith-bad faith, and so
on).
104. E. SCHUMACHER, supra note 2, at 126-27.
105. See J. NAISBETr, MEGATRENDS: TEN NEW DIRECTIONS TRANSFORMING OUR LIVES
(1982). One of the "megatrends" Naisbett suggests is the movement from an "either/or" dichoto-
mized-option society to a "multiple option" society. The law certainly reflects that megatrend; there
has been a movement from the harsher absolute immunity, to the multiple options of qualified im-
munity, which is precisely why the law has become more complex and balanced, though more
unpredictable.
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IV. DICHOTOMIES AND DEGREE IN LAW AND JUSTICE
John Stuart Mill noted that a term often "is best defined by its oppo-
site."10 6 Dichotomies often are defined by their opposites. If defined as
in-kind opposites, liability is the absence of immunity and immunity is
the absence of liability. The law provides its own terms for these two
opposites on each end of the continuum: "absolute immunity" and
"strict liability." Yet, the law also has terms to express varying degrees
on the continuum between the extreme opposites: "qualified immunity"
and "limited liability." Figure 1 attempts to illustrate the in-kind dichot-
omies and the degrees between the dichotomies.
Figure 1
In Kind Jural Opposite
Immunity Ambiguous, Liability




Absolute Qualified "Patchwork Qualified Absolute
Immunity Immunity Quilt" of ("Quasi") ("Strict")
Immunity/ Liability Liability
Liability
Degrees of Immunity/Liability Mixture
Between In-Kind Opposites
Figure 1 does not describe accurately the opposites and degrees between
opposites in any present legal system. As Justice Brennan noted: "In
actuality, the distinction . . . is better characterized not as a line, but as
a succession of points." 10 7 However, Justice Cardozo may be even more
accurate when he observed that often there is neither a continuum, nor a
succession of points: "The continuum does not exist. Instead there are
leaps from point to point. We have been beguiled by the ideal of harmo-
nious progression." 108 Thus, the ideal is a continuum of degrees between
dichotomous opposites and a logical progression on the continuum; the
reality is more often a scattering, a patchwork quilt, a shifting, perhaps
106. Mill, Utilitarianism in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 465 (R. Hutchins ed.
1952).
107. Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 621, 644 n.26 (1980).
108. B. CARDOZO, supra note 3, at 4.
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zigzagging, movement back and forth between the lure of immunity for
the public interest and the tug of liability for individual justice.
This dynamic movement of the courts and legal systems back and
forth between conflicting, yet fundamental, concepts has received many
descriptions. Usually the analyses indicate dual poles and the oscillation
between the polarities may be called an "ebb and flow,"' 0 9 "yin and
yang," 110 "seesaw,""' "rise and fall,"' 12 "zigzag,",1 3 "periodic waves of
reform." 114 As the former President of the ABA noted, there are many
polarities in the law. "These dualities, if not eternal, have long appeared
in Anglo-American history."' 115 Meador notes that virtually every re-
form measure involves a shifting between the polarities, and reforms
often meet defeat in the name of an absolute that fails to seek a balance
or to recognize the need for diverse solutions along the continuum be-
tween the polar opposites. "[C]ourt reforms too often swing from one
[extreme] to the other without an attempt to balance the interests
involved."' 
16
Justice Cardozo, like Hohfeld who isolated jural opposites and Mill
who noted the tendency to define a term by its opposite, also observed
this strong tendency in the law to dichotomize concepts into opposites.
Cardozo suggested that these important dichotomies create the "para-
doxes" inherent in law and justice. "Dichotomy is everywhere," wrote
Cardozo, and these "unending paradoxes" create problems of law and
justice in which "fundamental opposites clash."' 17 Understanding and
synthesizing conflicting opposites is the essence of doing justice.
Our neural systems seem better adapted to the binary program of yes-
no responses than to the responses of yes/but or no/but. . . . Learn-
ing the law is not merely learning principles. In fact, we do not really
"know" a principle until we know its opposing principles .... Legal
thinking requires a resolution in the individual mind and encourages
the finding of solutions that transcend, as by synthesis, the polar oppo-
sites of a debate.
This process is not easy, but on its cultivation may depend the
109. Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren
and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151 (1980).
110. Meador, supra note 1, at 122.
111. I. JENKINS, SOCIAL ORDER AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 253 (1980).
112. Zalman, The Rise and Fall of the Indeterminate Sentence, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 45 (1977).
113. Spader, supra note 39; Spader, Fundamental Value Conflicts in Law; The Search for the
Golden Zigzag, 7 A.L.S.A. FORUM 1 (1983).
114. M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 261 (1961).
115. Meador, supra note 1, at 122.
116. Nejelski, The Jeffersonian-Hamiltonian Duality A Framework for Understanding Reforms
in the Administration of Justice, 64 JUDICATURE 450, 460 (1981).
117. B. CARDOZO, supra note 3, at 132, 134.
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pursuit of justice in society.' ' 8
A full understanding of justice, then, requires an understanding and reso-
lution of fundamentally opposite and dichotomous principles.
Many areas of the law which involve the reconciliation of dualities
or polarities, both of which are fundamental concepts representing im-
portant fundamental values, seem to possess an area between the ex-
tremes that results in inconsistent, ambiguous, or highly unpredictable
law. When critics or dissenting judges perceive this lack of clarity in the
law, they refer to it as "patchwork quilt," '" 9 "a scatter-gun approach,"' 120
"establishing various formulas."' 21 When the law moves to an extreme
on either end of the continuum (that is, toward absolute immunity or
strict liability), the law obtains clarity and predictability, but at the cost
of sacrificing extremely important policy considerations underlying the
opposite pole of the duality. Conversely, if the law attempts to reconcile
and balance both parts of the duality, thereby attempting to preserve
both sets of opposite policy considerations, the law tends to become more
unclear, unpredictable, and more like a patchwork quilt. 122 Again, Car-
dozo eloquently suggests how courts proceed in this patchwork quilt area
of the law.
We will leave it to be "pricked out" by a process of inclusion and ex-
clusion in individual cases. That was to play safely, and very likely to
play wisely. The question is how long we are to be satisfied with a
series of ad hoc conclusions. It is all very well to go on pricking the
lines, but the time must come when we shall do prudently to look them
over, and see whether they make a pattern or a medley of scraps and
patches. ' 2
3
Unfortunately, when the ad hoc "pricking" involves the clarification and
choice of the multiple options on a continuum between two fundamental
dualities, the "pattern" Cardozo seeks to perceive will likely be a dy-
namic, shifting pattern. Jaffe, after analyzing U.S. Court cases on the
immunity-liability issue, concludes: "A group of cases before and after
Lee establishes a somewhat wavering pattern." 24 When fundamental
opposites are involved, there is no golden mean (or if there is, it is only
temporary), there is only a golden zigzag. 125 Cardozo describes this zig-
118. Freund, Law in the Schools in LAW, JUSTICE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY 159 (J.
Tapp and F. Levine eds. 1977).
119. "In summary, the system of governmental liability resembles a patchwork, and a rather
imperfectly constructed one, at that." W. GELHORN AND C. BYSE, supra note 24, at 377.
120. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 765 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
121. Jaffe, supra note 38, at 36.
122. Comment, supra note 34.
123. B. CARDOZO, supra note 3, at 96.
124. Jaffe, supra note 38, at 24.
125. See Spader, supra note 39.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
zagging between the fundamental opposites of immunity and liability:
Hardly a rule of today but may be matched by its opposite of yester-
day. Absolute liability for one's acts is today the exception; there must
commonly be some tinge of fault, whether willful or negligent. Time
was, however, when absolute liability was the rule. . . . For every
tendency, one seems to see a countertendency; for every rule its antin-
omy. Nothing is stable. Nothing absolute. All is fluid and change-
able. . . . We are back with Heraclitus . . . [i]n this perpetual
flux .... 126
In this perpetual flux-here, between liability and immunity-the cher-
ished values of stability, clarity, predictability, certainty, and uniformity
which underlie precedent, rule of law, and the doctrine of stare decisis,
give way to other fundamental values which outweigh maintenance of
the status quo.
V. DRAWING LINES BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL OPPOSITES
It is not new to state that "no bright line can be drawn" between
fundamental policy considerations. 127 Nor is it novel to suggest that
there ought to be different rules for different points along the contin-
uum. 128 Presumably, the oft-used phrase, "to distinguish a line of cases,"
means that given different facts, issues, parties, levels of government,
levels of employees, policy considerations, and so on, the court will move
to a different point on the continuum, sometimes granting more immu-
nity and sometimes imposing more liability. Degrees of immunity or lia-
bility are implied in such terms as "varying scope" or "range of
discretion." It then becomes very difficult to find a strict linguistic
formula which summarizes the potentially infinite number of degrees and
multiple options available for resolving any issue in the complex middle
ground. Again, Cardozo summarized the problem of diversity and de-
gree in a few eloquent sentences:
Our survey of judicial methods teaches us, I think, the lesson that the
whole subject matter of jurisprudence is more plastic, more malleable,
the moulds less definitely cast, the bounds of right and wrong less pre-
ordained and constant, than most of us, without the aid of some analy-
sis, have been accustomed to believe. We draw our little lines, and they
are hardly down before we blur them. As in time and space, so here.
Divisions are working hypotheses, adopted for convenience. We are
tending more and more toward an appreciation of the truth that, after
126. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 26-28 (1921).
127. The courts often observe, but rarely analyze why, the bright line between two opposites is
incapable of being drawn. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 648 n.31
(1980).
128. "Fortunately, there seems to be no necessity to have a uniform rule. It should be feasible to
apply the immunity doctrine differently in different areas .. " Jaffe, supra note 67, at 225.
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all, there are few rules; there are chiefly standards and degrees ....
So also the duty of a judge becomes itself a question of degree. . . . If
this seems a weak and inconclusive summary, I am not sure that the
fault is mine.
129
Human language and human symbols are not capable of the efficient and
accurate categorization of all the degrees on the continuum. Dichoto-
mies, however, are efficiency devices, and often in the zeal to be efficient
we use dichotomies to lump immensely diverse social realities into two
categories: right-wrong, good faith-bad faith, intentional-unintentional,
subjective-objective, reasonable-unreasonable, within scope-without
scope, discretionary-ministerial, governmental-proprietary, immunity-li-
ability. Cardozo is correct: "Dichotomy is everywhere." ' 130 Concep-
tually, then, it helps to look at the dichotomies and their underlying
rationales, before making the move into the complexity of degrees be-
tween the dichotomies.
1. Absolute Immunity
Absolute immunity is a defense that does not recognize degrees,
whether in the harm caused by the government's action or the degree of
intent with which the harm is caused.13 1 Under absolute immunity,
"even the most egregious, knowing, and malicious acts of certain state
officers, producing perhaps incalculable harm to constitutional rights,
nonetheless can create no officer liability as a matter of law."' 132 When
absolute immunity attaches, the courts apply neither a subjective stan-
dard ("known") nor an objective standard ("should have known") to an
officer's conduct. The case does not reach the "merits," which involve
degrees of intentionality or negligence, degree s of harm and responsibil-
ity, and many other traditional doctrines. If absolute liability imposes
liability even in the absence of fault, absolute immunity grants immunity
even in the presence of an allegation of fault and malice.
1 33
Absolute immunity should not be confused with sovereign immu-
nity, though historically it has been the sovereign or state that has pos-
sessed absolute immunity. Absolute immunity pertains to the extent of
129. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 161-62 (1921) (emphasis added).
130. B. CARDOZO, supra note 3, at 132.
131. See Jaffe, supra note 67.
132. Wolcher, supra note 36, at 222. Professor Prosser explains that immunity "avoids liability
in tort under all circumstances, within the limits of the immunity itself; it is conferred, not because of
the particular facts, but because of the status or position of the favored defendant; and it does not
deny the tort, but the resulting liability." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131,
at 970 (4th ed. 1971).
133. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959) (granting absolute immunity despite a claim of
malice).
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exception from liability; sovereign immunity pertains to the legal entity
which possesses the exception from liability. Nor should absolute immu-
nity or sovereign immunity be confused with the immunity contained in
the eleventh amendment. Sovereign immunity protects states from liabil-
ity suits in their own courts, while the eleventh amendment protects
states from suits by a private citizen in the federal courts.
1 34
Absolute immunity allows the holder "without liability, to deliber-
ately cause serious injury to any number of citizens even though he
knows his conduct violates a statute or tramples on the constitutional
rights of those who are injured." 1 35  Because it contravenes traditional
notions of individual justice, only the strongest reasons of public policy
can justify it, even then it is constantly buffeted by advocates of liability,
individual autonomy, and rights-based philosophies. The following brief
survey indicates its availability for officials in the different branches of
government.
A. The Executive Branch
Under present case law, the President of the United States enjoys
absolute immunity, 136 as do state prosecuting attorneys,1 37 but the gover-
nors as chief executives of the sovereign states do not have absolute im-
munity,1 38 nor do high level cabinet officials or other officials in the
executive branch when they are sued for constitutional violations. 139 It
appears that if the violation is not a constitutional violation, governors
and other executive branch officials may still have some of the near abso-
lute immunity granted by previous cases.' 4° However, Schwartz has
noted that ordinary "tortious official conduct can easily be framed in
134. In federal courts, the eleventh amendment defense is jurisdictional, and questions of juris-
diction are preliminary to issues of merit. Therefore, if the defense prevails, the merits are not
considered. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974) (eleventh amendment bars
relief even though not raised by the State in the trial court); Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treas., 323
U.S. 459, 467 (1945).
135. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 764 (1982) (White, J., dissenting to the grant of absolute
immunity from civil damages to the President for official acts within the "outer perimeter" of the
President's official responsibility). But see U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (denying President the
claim of executive privilege in refusing to respond to the Special Prosecutor's subpoena duces tecum).
136. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
137. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (granting absolute immunity against § 1983 law-
suits in the initiating and prosecuting of a state's case).
138. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
139. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
140. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); U.S. v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines), 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984) (granting discretionary function exception of Federal Tort
Claims Act to actions of Government regulating conduct of private individuals); Sylvester, Regula-
tory Agencies Better Shielded From Suit? Nat'l L.J., July 2, 1984, at 5, col. 1.
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constitutional terms."' 4 1 For example, the common law tort of trespass
can become a violation of the fourth amendment's privacy right to be free
from governmental intrusions, and many wrongs can be couched in the
accordian-like due process terminology. Therefore, absolute immunity
has waned considerably for executive branch officers other than the Pres-
ident and prosecutors since its apex in the Barr v. Matteo era.
142
B. The Judicial Branch
Since 1871, American judges have possessed absolute immunity
from civil damages actions for judicial acts performed within the judge's
jurisdiction. 43 A survey of recent cases reported that "recorded cases
reveal virtual unanimous and unyielding support by both state and fed-
eral courts for the absolute quality of judicial immunity."' 44  The
Supreme Court reaffirmed the absolute immunity recently, after a lower
federal court allowed a woman who was sterilized pursuant to a judge's
order to sue the judge.' 45 Judicial immunity does not bar, however, pro-
spective injunctive relief against a judicial official acting within judicial
capacity, nor is it a bar to an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988.146
Absolute immunity can extend to officials in the executive branch of
government who exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, adjudicatory or
prosecutorial-type powers. Administrative agencies are usually in the ex-
ecutive branch, as are prosecutors and parole board members. The
Court has extended absolute immunity to administrative law judges or
hearing examiners and decisionmakers who are on the prosecuting staffs
of agencies. 147 A recent Supreme Court decision upheld a California
statute which provided absolute immunity to parole board officials in
their decisions to parole or revoke parole of a parolee, although this case
included only a tort violation under state law and not a federal constitu-
tional violation.' 48 However, lower federal courts and some state courts
have held that the Parole Board is an arm of the sentencing judge when it
grants, denies, or revokes parole, thereby bringing the members under
141. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 563 (1984).
142. Some executive branch officials have "quasi-judicial" functions; the presence of these hybrid
powers may grant absolute immunity. See infra, notes 147-49, and accompanying text.
143. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
144. Way, A Call for Limits to Judicial Immunity: Must Judges be King in Their Courts?, 64
JUDICATURE 390, 394 (1981).
145. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
146. Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984).
147. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
148. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
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the umbrella of judicial immunity. 149
C. The Legislative Branch
Legislators clearly have absolute immunity for some of their func-
tions. "The Federal Constitution grants absolute immunity to Members
of both Houses of the Congress with respect to any speech, debate, vote,
report, or action done in session."150 Absolute immunity during legisla-
tive activities protects legislators from executive and judicial interference
and preserves the separation of powers. The immunity protects the free-
dom of speech and debate from being subjected to scrutiny of other
branches of government.
2. Absolute Liability
On its face, absolute liability, sometimes referred to as strict liability
or blanket liability, may appear as unjust toward government as absolute
immunity is toward individual victims of government action.151 Abso-
lute liability for a personal injury or property harm exists even if a) the
government used all due care and thus was not negligent, or b) the gov-
ernment official acted in good faith and thus possessed no malicious in-
tent, bad faith, or other mens rea to which blame, fault, or culpability is
ascribed. If absolute immunity dismisses plaintiffs claims irrespective of
the mens rea of the government official and the merits of the plaintiff's
case, absolute liability does the opposite and imposes liability on the gov-
ernment's actions irrespective of blameworthiness. In short, absolute im-
munity grants immunity and absolute liability imposes liability without
getting at fault. Both are no-fault doctrines because both look beyond
the issue of fault (whether negligent or intentional) to the desired sub-
stantive result-immunity for public interests or liability for compensa-
tion and reparation.
Schwartz argues that "[o]ne of the important trends in modern tort
law has been the movement to replace fault by the compensation princi-
ple of strict liability."' 152 Advocates of absolute liability wish to forego
the issue of who is at fault and rather address the issue of how to com-
pensate injured parties. Schwartz believes that when governmental ac-
149. See R. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 184-85 (1977).
150. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974); Gravel v. U.S., 408 U.S. 606 (1972); U.S. v.
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
151. But see R. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY (1980) (proposing a system based
more on causation and compensation than on negligence and fault).
152. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 141, at 571. See also B. SCHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA
194-285 (1974).
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tion, even if in good faith and with due care, injures innocent individuals,
the government should spread the loss of those injuries by compensating
the injured through taxation. No-fault concepts have replaced fault-
based tort in such areas as workman's compensation, unemployment in-
surance, no-fault insurance, products liability, and so on. Schwartz be-
lieves that public tort liability ought also to adopt the principle of
compensation rather than fault:
The trend toward compensation has only begun to penetrate the law of
public tort liability. Compensation is based upon reparation rather
than fault; it requires absolute liability under what amounts to a sys-
tem of insurance of social risk, i.e., the risk arising from social activity
carried on for the benefit of the insured. This social insurance theory is
particularly appropriate to deal with injuries caused by governmental
activities. Such activities are carried on for the benefit of the entire
community, and the risks of injury involved should also be borne by
the community as a whole. The state becomes the virtual insurer of its
own activities. The risk that for a private entrepreneur is spread by
liability insurance is apportioned by the state among the community as
a whole by the working of the tax system. In this approach, public tort
liability will be replaced by the ultimate principle that the taxpaying
public should bear most of the injuries that result from governmental
activity. Public tort liability will be replaced by what amounts to a
governmental-operated system of mutual insurance for those damaged
by administrative action.
In other countries, notably France, the law has gone far in the
direction just outlined. The trend has only just begun in American
law, but the essential first step has been taken with the growing move-
ment to abrogate sovereign immunity and the substitution of govern-
mental liability for the common-law rule of officer liability. The
essential next step is the replacement of the Dalehite prohibition by the
principle of absolute liability, at least in those cases where there is
comparable liability imposed upon a private tortfeasor. Ultimately the
notion of absolute liability will spread as it has in other countries, with
tort liability giving way to a risk theory of social insurance, whose key
idea will be that a beneficent government should not allow exceptional
losses to be borne by those upon whom governmental activity has hap-
pened to inflict such losses. The basis for governmental liability will be
not fault but compensation, which works equitable loss-spreading.
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Advocates of absolute liability in the public tort area believe that the
state should adopt the insurance principles of spreading the risk and
should become a mutual insurance company against accidents, thereby
evenly distributing the costs of governmental mishaps among all citizens
rather than letting them fall unevenly and excessively on the particular
victims incurring the losses.
153. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 141, at 574-75 (footnotes omitted).
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The Supreme Court has begun to adopt this social insurance theory
by giving qualified immunity to governmental officials but imposing strict
liability on the government.1 54 This policy also acts as a basic liability
insurance for government employees, who will not be sued if they act in
good faith and reasonably, but whose governmental unit ("the deep
pocket") will be absolutely liable. Although the governmental unit in-
curs strict liability, the official possesses qualified immunity.
55
3. Qualified Immunity and Limited Liability
After listing the extremes of absolute immunity and liability on the
continuum, it becomes apparent that a large majority of all governmental
officials and governmental units possess only qualified immunity, or are
subject to the many degrees which qualify their liability. The issue of
qualified immunity always involves three questions, two of dichotomy
and one of degree.
1. Question of dichotomy: Does immunity apply, or not?
2. Question of dichotomy: If immunity does not apply, is there
liability?
3. Question of degree: If there is liability, how much liability exists?
The first question of dichotomy has only two answers: either the official
and the government are immune or not immune. If immune, the case is
dismissed. If not immune, the case proceeds past the motion to dismiss.
If on the merits of the case, no liability exists, then the case can also be
dismissed or judgment entered for the defendant at a number of points in
the pretrial and trial process. This second question is also a question of
dichotomy. Either liability exists, or it does not. If liability exists, then
only does the question of degree arise: how much liability exists? Only if
the first two dichotomous questions are answered affirmatively does the
adjudication move to the question of degree. The following discussion
deals only with the initial question of whether immunity applies. The
courts use a number of factors to determine whether immunity exists;
however, these can be summarized into four basic tests, all of which use
dichotomous terminology. Figure 2 outlines the four tests used to deter-
mine the yes-no question pertaining to qualified immunity.
154. Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
155. "Cities whose action is later held to violate a person's constitutional rights are now liable
for damages, no matter how clear the law was at the time of their action that it was constitutional,




Qualified Liability Qualified Immunity
(Liability may exist); (Irrmunity may exist)
1. Within Scope Authority 1. Without scope of Authority
("intra vires") ("ultra vires")
2. Discretionary Decision 2. Ministerial Decision
Policy-Making Discretion Enforcement Discretion
Planning Level Operational Level
3. Good Faith (Mens Rea) 3. Bad Faith (Mens Rea)
Subjective: "Didn't Know" Subjective: "Knew"
Objective: Reasonable Objective: Unreasonable
("Should Have Known")
4. Governmental Function 4. Proprietary Function
In the initial decision, the law judges in dichotomies, not degrees.
Either immunity attaches or it does not. There may be some decisions of
governmental officials which are immune and some which are not; how-
ever, if immunity, whether absolute or qualified, exists for any given ac-
tion at any given point, then no liability attaches. The difficulty lies in
knowing (perhaps predicting) beforehand or determining after the act
whether immunity does or does not apply. Because all three tests are
composed of broad, vague, and highly ambiguous terms, the task is not
easy. However, an initial litmus test is simply to ask three questions:
1) Is the act or decision within or without the scope of authority?
2) Is the decision a policymaking, planning level, discretionary
decision?
3) Is the decision made in subjective good faith and objective good
faith?
If all appear to be affirmative, immunity likely will attach. If any are
answered negatively, liability may be imposed. Or, in other words, if the
action is outside the scope of authority of the official (and some officials
have broad "outer perimeters"), or the decision is deemed an operational
level ministerial decision, or is performed with guilty knowledge or mali-
cious intent, or is deemed unreasonable in that the official should have
known the law (or other relevant standard), or any combination of the
above, then immunity may take flight and liability descend upon the offi-
cial and/or governmental body. There are hundreds of cases providing
specific examples of each test. Other than to provide specific examples
where the tests have been applied, the law seems incapable of being more
specific because the law uses abstract dichotomous terms which, by defi-
nition, are "chameleon-hued words." 156 The broader dichotomous con-
cepts have bred a legion of more specific dichotomies.
156. W. HOHFELD, supra note 9, at 35. The presence of accordian-like terms leads some ana-
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Finally, there are numerous other dichotomies and distinctions
which are used to determine whether immunity or liability applies.
These include:
1. Whether prospective (injunctions, declaratory orders) or retroac-
tive (damages) remedies are sought;
2. Whether a constitutional tort or a common law tort is alleged;
3. Whether substantive due process or procedural due process is al-
legedly violated;
4. Whether the allegation is against state/local or federal
government;
5. Whether it is a civil or criminal proceeding;
6. Whether the suit is against the government or the officer;
7. Whether the court must use statutory or nonstatutory review.
When all of these different spokes are factored into the balance wheel of
justice, consistency and balancing becomes much more difficult. Davis
concludes "The present system of liability for wrongs committed by fed-
eral, state, and local officers and employees is shot through with unsound
complexities."' 57  His suggestion for removing the complexities is to
move out of the complex middle ground of qualified immunity toward a
"simpler" system based primarily upon governmental liability, remedies
for deliberate and negligent torts, retention of the essential discretionary
function exception, disciplinary, perhaps monetary, remedies against of-
fending officers by the governmental unit, and a few other
"improvements." 1'58
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
We noted Cardozo's statement that "dichotomy is everywhere" and
Hohfeld's analysis of four basic jural opposites (one of which is immu-
nity-liability). It becomes apparent that jural opposites exist not only at
the level of fundamental legal conceptions but they also pervade all sub-
sets of legal terminology used to analyze and apply these fundamental
legal concepts. The dichotomous subsets (discretionary-ministerial, good
lysts to the position that the myth of clarity and the reality of ambiguity is a smokescreen for judicial
creativity. However, the author concurs with the following:
It is fatally easy and has become increasingly common to make the transition from the
exhilarating discovery that complex words like "cause" cannot be simply defined and have
no "one true meaning" to the mistaken conclusion that they have no meaning worth both-
ering about at all, but are used as a mere disguise for arbitrary decision or judicial policy.
This is blinding error, and legal language and reasoning will never develop while it persists.
H.L.A. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 3 (1959).
157. K. DAVIS, supra note 74, § 26.23 at 475.
158. Id. See also ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1982 REPORT 58,
Recommendation 82-86 (1982) (adopting essentially the same recommendation). Davis has been
advocating more governmental unit liability since the 1958 publication of his treatise. See K. DAVIS,
supra note 24, at 500-05.
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faith-bad faith, reasonable-unreasonable, intentional-unintentional, gov-
ernmental-proprietary, objective-subjective, within-without the scope of
authority) flow from the more fundamental legal dichotomy.
Herein lies the limits of the law, rationality, and legal terminology.
Legal reality is dichotomous; social reality is infinite degrees. In law, a
set of facts leads either to immunity or liability, two very expansive cate-
gories (or pigeonholes depending upon one's perspective). On the contin-
uum between the dichotomies of immunity and liability lie a potentially
infinite set of varying fact patterns, all of which must be classified and
reduced to either/or, either immunity or liability. At the extreme ends of
the continuum, categorization is relatively easy. When a governmental
official acts with malice and bad faith in an "unparalleled indeed aber-
rant, episode" which deprives an individual of a number of constitutional
rights, then clearly immunity disappears and liability should be im-
posed.1 59 However, like a color chart of the shades between black and
white, the many degrees of grey make drawing a clear line between sets
of dichotomies a very difficult, if not humanly impossible, task to accom-
plish. The Supreme Court itself, when discussing the governmental-pro-
prietary dichotomy, spoke of
the "nongovernmental"-"governmental" quagmire that has long
plagued the law. . . . A comparative study of the cases in the forty-
eight States will disclose an irreconcilable conflict. More than that, the
decisions in each of the States are disharmonious and disclose the inev-
itable chaos .... 160
When a number of judges as human decisionmakers apply broad dichot-
omous concepts which allow extensive discretion, the human result inevi-
tably will be inconsistent, nonuniform, and unpredictable. The result is
human, and decrying the result is human; yet, by definition, humans can-
not find a solution to a human limitation using solely human means. The
dichotomous constructs of the human mind are the source of the
problems or paradoxes, and it takes more than logic and rationality to
transcend them. Dichotomous sets of words are merely efficiency devices
to classify and decide.
Words only represent (re-present) something else. They are not real
things. They are only symbols. . . . Paradoxes are common. ...
Paradoxes are the places where our rational mind bumps into its own
limitations. . . . Opposites, such as good-bad, beautiful-ugly, birth-
death, and so on, are . . . mental structures which we have created.
These self-made illusions are the sole cause of paradoxes. To escape
159. Cruz v. Beto, 453 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Texas 1977) (imposing governmental and personal
liability).
160. Indiana Towing Co. v. U.S., 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955).
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the bonds of conceptual limitations is to hear the sound of one hand
clapping. . . . "Understanding" involves passing the barrier of
paradox?
1 6 1
The rational, logical, legal mind creates symbols (words) that are oppo-
sites. These symbolic opposites produce paradoxes which the rational
mind cannot resolve because one opposite cannot make logical sense
without the other (good faith is meaningless without the concept of bad
faith). The logical, rational, legal mind cannot operate without oppo-
sites, for to do so is to try to hear the sound of one hand clapping. "Un-
derstanding" or wisdom is a human act that requires qualities beyond
logic. Logic can not hear the sound of one hand clapping because it
requires dualism. "Logic does not help us because it insists that if one
thing is true its opposite cannot be true at the same time. It also insists
that if a thing is good, more of it is better."'
' 6 2
Understanding transcends logic and passes the barrier of paradox.
Understanding can hear the sound of one hand clapping. It moves be-
yond dichotomous symbols to unity; it is monistic. Logic is analysis
(ana-breaking, lysis-apart); understanding is synthesis (syn-together,
tithenai-to place) at a level different than the level of the analysis. Logic
creates irreconcilable conflicts by creating dichotomous verbal symbols;
understanding moves beyond the symbolic dichotomies to the reality
(rea-thing, object, experience) re-presented by the symbols. 6 3 Logic
alone leads to paralysis by analysis; understanding transcends logical
opposites.
Pairs of opposites, then, are the result of legal analysis and these
opposite constructs allow courts to classify an action as reasonable or
unreasonable, a decision good faith or bad faith, and so on. Once the
classification is made, then the ultimate decision whether liability or im-
munity attaches will follow from the classification. Opposing symbols
are the tools to impose or not impose legal sanction. The process of mak-
ing and imposing rules is the process of isolating dichotomous positions
by logic and then transcending the logical opposites through higher un-
derstanding. From understanding comes wise judgment. "Again, the
task of judging is found to be a choice between antithetical extremes.'
1 64
161. G. ZUKER, THE DANCING Wu Li MASTERS 255, 205 (1979).
162. E. SCHUMACHER, supra note 2, at 123.
163. See T. PETERS & R. WATERMAN, IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE (1982). "The Belgian Sur-
realist Ren6 Magritte painted a series of pipes and entitled the series Ceci nest pas une pipe (This is
not a pipe). The picture of the thing is not the thing." Id. at 3. Likewise, the words describing a
social "thing" are not the social event. Though obvious, the realization that a word describing an
event is not the event is often forgotten. The process of reification, or the substitution of words for
the reality, permeates human interaction.
164. B. CARDOZO, supra note 3, at 62.
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Cardozo wisely observes that the final decision may be anywhere on the
continuum, even the extremes.
Like the Aristotelian mean between extremes, the path of compromise
will not be found by figuring the mean proportional as in an exercise in
mathematics. If two extremes present themselves as possible solutions
of any given controversy, we do not reach the true solution by rejecting
both extremes as certainly unacceptable, and seeking a middle course.
There will be many situations in which one of the extremes will mark
the course to be selected. . . .A choice is arrived at by a balancing of
interests, an approval of their value with reference to jural ends.' 6 5
Sometimes the extremes of absolute immunity or strict liability are the
"true solution." Depending on the "jural ends" to be sought, the final
balancing may result in a movement toward the polar opposite. Law is
the process of resolving the many paradoxes in society. Paul Freund cap-
sulizes this theme:
Rules of law are often accommodations between right and right rather
than condemnations of obvious wrong. Legal thinking strives to re-
solve in an acceptably fair way, and in specific contexts, the great an-
tinomies of freedom and constraint, privacy and the right to know, free
press and fair trial, security of acquisitions and freedom of transac-
tions, national citizenship and local autonomy. . . . These are the
hard questions of justice that challenge the powers of creativity. Legal
thinking requires a resolution in the individual mind and encourages
the finding of solutions that transcend, as by a synthesis, the polar oppo-
sites of a debate.
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The first task of the law is to recognize the conflicts: "If life feels the tug
of these opposing opposites, so also must the law which is to prescribe
the rule of life."' 67 And those who cannot or will not understand that
dichotomous, divergent problems are human problems re-presented in
human symbols (words) will forever mistake a temporary solution for an
absolute answer, thereby slipping into complacency and false security.
The price of democracy is eternal vigilance precisely because "every-
where society's health depends on the simultaneous pursuit of mutually
opposed activities or aims. The adoption of a final solution means a kind
of death sentence for man's humanity and spells either cruelty or dissolu-
tion, generally both."1
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Some conflicts are ancient, enduring, inevitable, insoluble, necessary
and productive of a healthy and dynamic system of laws. 169 The immu-
165. Id. at 56.
166. Freund, supra note 118, at 159 (emphasis added).
167. B. CARDOZO, supra note 3, at 7.
168. E. SCHUMACHER, supra note 2, at 127.
169. See M. DUETSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE
PROCESSES (1973); R. KREBS, CREATIVE CONFLICT (1982).
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nity-liability conflict is one of these unending paradoxes where funda-
mental opposites clash. What can be gained by openly recognizing,
logically clarifying, and endlessly pursuing such irreconcilable conflicts?
Insight and creative solutions. The cross-fertilization of perspectives be-
comes the source to divine a higher, more sophisticated and humane syn-
thesis. "[T]he creative act is an encounter between two poles" and
because it takes courage to forego certainty for dichotomy, it takes
"courage to create." 170 Enduring conflicts require enduring creativity.
170. R. MAY, THE COURAGE TO CREATE 89 (1975).
